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A.J. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 28 (June 1, 2017)1 
 
CRIMINAL LAW: JUVENILE PROSTITUTION ADJUDICATION 
 
 
Summary 
 
NRS 62C.240 is triggered when circumstances surrounding a juvenile’s arrest plainly 
demonstrate that the juvenile was arrested for prostitution or solicitation even if the juvenile is 
charged with offenses other than prostitution or solicitation. 
 
Background 
 
 In 2015, Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) stopped and arrested 15-
year-old petitioner, A.J., for soliciting prostitution and loitering for the purpose of prostitution. 
The State filed 4 petitions against A.J. First, the State filed a delinquency petition (Petition 1) 
charging A.J. with obstructing an officer based on her refusal to provide identification. A.J. entered 
an admission to the charge and was adjudicated as a delinquent. She was then placed on formal 
probation, and various other conditions. She was placed at St. Jude’s Ranch for Children with GPS 
monitoring. However, once the GPS monitoring was removed, she ran away.  
In September, LVMPD again arrested A.J. for soliciting prostitution. The State filed two 
subsequent petitions (Petition 2 and 3) alleging A.J. violated her probation for various reasons. 
The juvenile court determined that A.J. would remain detained pending entry of a plea. She 
admitted to violating her probation, and the court dismissed Petitions 2 and 3. She was continued 
on formal probation and released to Clark County Department of Family Services (CCDFS) with 
GPS monitoring.  
In November, a placement home was located for A.J., and the GPS monitor was removed. 
Again, petitioner ran away, and a writ of attachment was issued. Petitioner was arrested on the 
writ, and the State filed another petition for violation of probation (Petition 4). The juvenile court 
committed petitioner to the Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) for placement. She 
petitioned for a writ of mandamus or prohibition directing the juvenile court to vacate its order 
adjudicating her as a delinquent and apply NRS 62C.240. 
 
Discussion 
 
Consideration of the writ petition 
 
 The Court addressed the issue of first impression that juvenile courts would likely face—
whether NRS 62C.240 applies where a minor is arrested for prostitution or solicitation, but the 
delinquency petition does not allege that the minor engaged in either of those offenses. Due to this 
legal question’s importance, and in the interest of judicial economy, the Court exercised its 
discretion to consider writ petitions for extraordinary relief here. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1  By Briana Martinez. 
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Interpretation of NRS 62C.240 
 
 The parties disagreed as to what triggered NRS 62C.240’s application. The State argued 
that the statute’s plain language required the district attorney to charge prostitution or solicitation 
to trigger NRS 62C.240. Further, the statute did not limit prosecutorial discretion, and the charges 
alleged in the petition controlled. A.J. argued that the underlying circumstances of the arrest, the 
referral charge, or other evidence that demonstrated prostitution or solicitation triggered NRS 
62C.240. The court agreed with A.J.  
The Court referenced the statute’s legislative history and determined that the Legislature 
intended for the conduct and circumstances surrounding the arrest to trigger NRS 62C.240.2 Here, 
the declaration of arrest stated A.J. was arrested for soliciting prostitution and loitering for the 
purpose of prostitution. The declaration did not indicate that A.J. was arrested for obstruction, yet 
that was the only charge alleged in Petition 1. The Court concluded that A.J.’s adjudication was 
precisely the type of circumstance which the Legislature intended to trigger the application of NRS 
62C.240.  
Further, the Court determined that the legislative history showed that NRS 62C.240’s intent 
was not to allow the State to file additional petitions for certain consent decree condition violations. 
Here, the juvenile court placed A.J. on probation for Petition 1, and when she violated her 
probation, the district attorney filed Petition 2. She was then adjudicated as a delinquent a second 
time on an act that should have triggered NRS 62C.240 protections if she had been under court 
supervision rather than formal probation.  
Finally, the Court addressed prosecutorial discretion under NRS 62C.240. Here, the Court 
determined it was clear from the Legislature’s testimony that the practice of filing fictitious charges 
in lieu of charges for solicitation or prostitution was rendered unnecessary by enacting NRS 
62C.240.  
The Court further held that these protections applied to prostitution-related crimes 
committed contemporaneous to an act. However, this did not mean juveniles were free from 
delinquency adjudication based on nonprostitution related crimes committed contemporaneous to 
the act that triggered NRS 62C.240. Therefore, the petitioner was entitled to NRS 62C.240 
protections, and the juvenile court abused its discretion by adjudicating her as a delinquent.  
 
Conclusion  
  
 The Court held that the Legislature clearly intended for NRS 62C.240 protections to be 
triggered when circumstances surrounding the arrest plainly demonstrate that the juvenile was 
arrested for engaging in prostitution or solicitation of prostitution. Further, the Court held these 
protections applied to prostitution-related crimes committed contemporaneous to an act. 
Accordingly, the Court granted A.J.’s writ petition and ordered the juvenile court to set aside A.J.’s 
earlier adjudications.  
 
                                                 
2  Hearing on A.B. 153 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 78th Leg. (Nev., April 29, 2015). 
